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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 17608 
This is an action by plaintiff, a loan broker, to collect a 
commission for obtaining a loan commitment for defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury. The 
Court entered a judgment of no cause of action, finding that the 
plaintiff had not earned the claimed commission. The Court awarded 
defendants' judgment on their counterclaim in the amount of 
$2,000.00, being the partial return of a good faith deposit paid 
by the defendants to the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and respondents seek to have the judgment of the 
lower court affirmed on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff William G. Vandever & Company (hereinafter referred 
to as "Vandever") is an Oklahoma corporation engaged in the loan 
brokering business. Defendants and respondents (hereinafter 
referred to as "Defendants") are four dentists engaged in the 
practice of dentistry in Salt Lake County. The transaction which 
is the subject of this lawsuit was the defendants' first venture 
into a commercial real estate transaction (T-34). 
In 1978, the defendants purchased a parcel of land in Salt 
Lake County with the intention of constructing thereon a dental 
clinic building. The defendants had been unsuccessful in obtain-
ing financing for the construction, and became in touch with a Mr. 
H. D. Merritt, who was employed by Vandever. The discussions with 
Merritt eventually led to the execution of a written agreement which 
was entitled "Authorization to Obtain Financing". 1 Under the agree-
ment, defendants agreed to pay to Vandever a commission based upon 
4% of the loan proceeds in the event Vandever was successful in 
obtaining a loan of $397,000.00, "or for such other amounts and/or 
terms as may be acceptable to the parties" 2 
1 The entire written "Authorization to Obtain Financing" is photo-
copied at Appendix A at the back of this brief. This document was 
Exhibit 3-P at the trial. This is the agreement under which Vandever 
has sued the defendants. It is a form agreement used routinely by 
Vandever in its brokerage business (T-83) . 
2 The quoted phrase is taken from paragraph 2 of the Agreement and 
is the salient language relied upon by the trial court. 
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Thereafter, Vandever notified the defendants that it could 
not get a loan commitment for $397,000.00 but could get a commit-
ment for $375,000.00. Vandever then delivered to defendants a 
preliminary commitment from American United Life Insurance Company 
for $375,000.00 (Exhibit 6-P). The preliminary commitment, except 
for some very minor items, was unconditional. 
Although defendants were disappointed about not obtaining the 
full financing, 3 they decided to accept the commitment of $375,000.00. 
They thereupon wrote a letter of acceptance as they were requested 
to do (Exhibit 7-P) , which was accompanied by a good faith deposit 
to the committing lender in the amount of $3, 750.00. The good 
faith deposit was in addition to another good faith deposit of 
$3,000.00 which had already been paid to Vandever (T-40). 
After American United Life Insurance Company received the good 
faith deposit, it issued and forwarded to the defendants its final 
loan commitment. However, when the final commitment was issued, 
it contained some eight pages of conditions (Exhibit 9-P). Many 
of the conditions were objectionable to the defendants. Some of 
the major conditions that the defendants found unacceptable were 
as follows: 
1. The final commitment was not for $375,000.00, but was for 
3 The original $397,000.00 had been the parties' estimate for 
100% financing, less the cost of the land and architect's fee 
(T-37). From the inception it had been the defendants' goal to 
obtain 100% financing (T-36) . 
-3-
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the lesser of $375,000.00 or 75% of the appraisal on the building 
(Exhibit 9-P, page 1). Since there was insufficient time in which 
to obtain an appraisal, defendants would have been forced to accept 
a commitment without knowing for sure what the final amount would 
be (T-41-43). 
2. The final commitment had no prepayment option, which was 
a matter of concern to the defendants (Exhibit 9-P, page 1; T-43). 
3. The final commitment provided that the loan could not ever 
be assigned (Exhibit 9-P, page 6). This was a matter of concern to 
the defendants as they wanted to be able to sell the property in 
future years (T-43). 
4. The final commitment prohibited any secondary financing 
(Exhibit 9-P, page 7). This made the package totally unacceptable, 
since the defendants knew that they weren't getting 100% financing 
and knew that they would have to get secondary financing, thus 
making the acceptance of the commitment impossible (T-43). 
5. The final commitment did not provide for construction 
financing and the defendants had understood that construction finan-
cing would be included (T-36,44). 
6. The final commitment required the defendants to pay all of 
the closing costs, lender's attorney's fees and other expenses in-
curred in connection with the building (Exhibit 9-P, page 7). This 
was of concern to the defendants as they had no idea as to what 
these expenses would be (T-44) . 
7. The final commitment was subject to approval and acceptance 
of the building after construction (Exhibit 9-P, page 5). 
-4-
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Defendants were concerned about the lender arbitrarily not accept-
ing the building after it was built (T-44). 
8. The final commitment required the purchase of insurance 
in an undefined amount (Exhibit 9-P, page 4). This was of concern 
to the defendants (T-44). 
9. An item of major importance was the fact that the commit-
ment was conditional upon the entire building being leased at a 
rental rate of $9. 75 per square foot (Exhibit 9-P, page 3). This 
was above the current rental value of $8.00 to $8.50 per square 
foot. Defendants did not believe that they could rent the space 
for more than its fair market value and didn't want to even try to 
ask tenants to pay an inflated rent (T-45). 
Prior to receiving the final commitment letter, the defendants 
had never been told of the above conditions (T-38,39). They felt 
that many of the conditions were unfair (T-62). They nevertheless 
gave very serious consideration to acceptance of the final commit-
ment, 4 but eventually concluded among themselves that they simply 
could not accept it. They thereupon notifed Merritt that they were 
declining the final loan commitment of American United Life Insurance 
Company (T-48). Merritt told them that if they didn't go ahead with 
the loan, a lawsuit would be filed by Vandever to collect the com-
mission. (T-49). This lawsuit then followed. 
4 The defendants even met together and signed the agreement, but 
it was never delivered to anyone (T-47). 
-5-
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The initial agreement between Vandever and the defendants 
had required defendants to pay a good faith deposit of $3,000.00, 
of which $2,000.00 was to be returned if Vandever was unsuccessful 
. . bl f. . 5 in securing accepta e inancing. This was the bas is of defendants' 
counterclaim upon which they were awarded judgment for the $2,000.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT VANDEVER IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY COMMISSION 
The following paragraphs taken from the agreement between the 
parties (See Appendix A) set forth the conditions under which 
Vandever would be entitled to a commission: 
"2. This authorization is for financing in the amount 
of $397,000.00, Three Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Dollars, 
for a period of (30) thirty years, with interest at a rate 
of not greater than (to be negotiated) % per annum, or for 
such other amounts and/or terms as may be acceptable to the 
parties. 
7. In consideration of WGV services in negotiating 
such financing, the undersigned agree to pay WGV or his 
assigns 4% of the total amount of the financing or loan 
commitment at the time the commitment is issued to the 
undersigned, their principals or agents. WGV's fee will 
be considered earned upon the issuance of financing or a 
loan commitment by the lending institution(s) and/or 
investor(s) in accordance with the terms of aaragraph two 
(2) above, and payment of WGV's fee will be ue upon 
issuance of same." (Emphasis added) 
After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that the 
loan commitment contained numerous conditions that were objection-
able; that no loan was ever obtained or offered on terms that were 
5 See paragraph 9 of the Agreement at Appendix A. 
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acceptable to the defendants; and that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover any commission (R-87). These findings are 
entitled to the usual presumptions on appeal. The findings and 
judgment are endowed with a presumption of validity; the party 
attacking the judgment has the burden of showing that it is in 
error; and the evidence and all inferences that fairly and reason-
ably may be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favor-
able to the prevailing party. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d, 205, 
381 P.2d 86. The Supreme Court should not substitute its judgment 
for that of the trial court on issues of fact when the findings are 
based upon substantial, competent and admissible evidence as was 
the case here. Fisher v. Taylor (Utah 1977), 572 P.2d 393. Also, 
the refusal of the trial court to modify the judgment upon motion 
for new trial (R-95-110) gives it a further degree of sanctity which 
increases the hesitancy in disturbing it upon review. Schneider v. 
Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822. 
Defendants have no quarrel with the decisions cited in 
appellant's brief to the effect that a real estate broker earns 
his commission when he produces a buyer who is ready, willing and 
able to purchase the listed property for the full amount of the 
listing price. If such a buyer is found, seller is liable for the 
commission regardless of whether he actually goes through with the 
sale. However, in comparing real estate cases, it is misleading to 
use cases involving offers for the full purchase price. A much 
more analogous situation is where the broker obtains an offer that 
is less, or otherwise varies from the listing price. Under these 
-7-
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circumstances, the general rule of law may be found at 12 Am.Jur. 
2d Brokers, §185, which provides as follows: 
"Where a broker, instead of procuring a person who is 
ready, able, and willing to accept the terms his princi-
authorized him to offer at the time of his employment, 
procures one who makes a counter offer more or less at 
variance with that of his employer, the latter is at 
liberty either to accept the proposed party upon the 
altered terms or to decline to do so, without giving 
the broker his reasons for the refusal. If he accepts, 
he is legally obligated to compensate the broker for the 
services rendered, but if he refuses he incurs no liability 
therefor." 
The above principle has been applied in the Utah case of 
Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d 644, 354 P.2d 1070. In Hansen, the 
broker delivered an offer where everything was in compliance with 
the listing except the rate of interest to be paid on an installment 
contract. The seller insisted upon 10~~ interest and the sale failed 
because the buyer was unwilling to pay that rate. The broker then 
sued for his commission claiming that the seller was demanding an 
unreasonable rate. The listing contract was silent as to any 
interest rate, and the trial court held with the broker finding 
that the seller's demand was unreasonable and that the statutory 
interest rate of 6% should apply. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision pointing out that the agreement of the 
parties had language to the effect that the sale was to be made 
on "terms to suit the seller" and that the interest rate was 
clearly a "term". Since the broker had not satisfied the seller 
as to this term, he had not met the conditions that would entitle 
him to a commission and there would be no obligation to pay the 
broker a commission under those circumstances. It may be noted 
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that the language "terms to suit the seller" as used in Hansen 
is substantially the same as "terms acceptable to the parties" as 
used in the instant case. 
Other typical recent cases supporting the position of the 
defendants are Boyer Company v. Lignell (Utah 1977), 567 P.2d 1112; 
Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Peterson (Utah 1978), 585 P.2d 
456; and Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine (Utah 1979), 595 P.2d 860. 
In Boyer Company v. Lignell, supra, the broker could not 
recover a commission where the offer differed from the listing 
agreement and the sale did not go through. The court made the 
following comments in its decision: 
"The law is well settled that the broker is not entitled 
to a real estate commission until he has a written binding 
offer or agreement signed by a ready, willing and able pur-
chaser. This means that all of the terms and conditions 
must be agreed upon between the parties. Since all of the 
terms were not agreed upon between the parties, no commis-
sion was earned." 
In Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Peterson, supra, a 
commission was not allowed where the terms of the offer differed 
from the listing agreement, even though the seller offered cash. 
And in Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, supra, no commission was 
allowed where the listing agreement did not require the seller to 
accept any offer. See also Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Irving 
Place Associates, Inc. (Utah 1980), 622 P.2d 784, holding that no 
contract existed between a mortgage broker and its customer where 
there was never any mutual assent to all of the essential terms. 
It is clear from all of the above authorities that the trial 
court correctly applied the law. 
-9-
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POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS OF LACK OF COOPERATION, FAILURE TO APPLY 
OBJECTIVE OR INDUSTRY STANDARD, AND REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT 
ARE WITHOUT MERIT 
Under Point III, IV, V and VI of appellant's brief, arguments 
are made with respect to claims of lack of cooperation, failure to 
apply objective or industry standards, and repudiation of contract. 
These points are completely without merit and may be dealt with in 
a summary manner. 
Lack of Cooperation. Appellant has cited no factual conduct 
in its brief that would show any lack of cooperation on the part of 
defendants. No evidence was presented of any such conduct. The 
only basis for this claim is the defendant's refusal to accept the 
final loan commitment. The cases are very clear that the refusal 
of a seller to accept terms that are objectionable to him does not 
constitute lack of cooperation. Boyer Company v. Lignell, supra; 
Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Peterson, supra. 
Objective Standard. The contract between the parties estab-
lishes as a condition to recovery the procuring of a loan commitment 
on "terms as may be acceptable to the parties". This language 
clearly establishes a subjective standard. Further, the contract 
form was a standard printed agreement used by Vandever routinely 
in its business (T-83), so if there is any ambiguity in the language 
as to the correct standard, the ambiguity must be construed strictly 
against the party that drafted the agreement and favorably to the 
other party against whom it is invoked. Wells Fargo Bank v. Midwest 
Realty & Finance Company (Utah 1975), 544 P.2d 882; Wagstaff v. 
-10-
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Remco, Inc. (Utah 1975), 540 P.2d 931. The case of Hansen v. Snell, 
supra, would also clearly require the application of a subjective 
standard. 
However, regardless of the above, the reasons given by the 
defendants for declining the loan commitment were not petty or 
whimsical, but were very substantial. The loan was declined not 
for one, but for many reasons. If a reasonable man standard is 
applied, the same result would necessarily follow. 
Industry Standard. Appellant claimed in its brief that the 
final commitment letter of American United Life Insurance Company 
was a "standard" real estate loan commitment. Respondents do not 
seriously believe that there is any such thing as a "standard" real 
estate loan. However, in any event, no evidence was offered at 
trial as to any industry standard. Vandever submitted a pre-trial 
witness list (R-57) wherein it listed William H. Starkweather as 
an expert witness to testify as to the terms of the financing 
commitment. Mr. Starkweather was never called as a witness. Cer-
tainly, the factfinder can view with mistrust any allegation that 
is unsupported by available evidence, if any such evidence exists 
(see J.I.F.U. §3.13). Further, there was no evidence whatsoever 
that any of the defendants would have had knowledge of any industry 
standard, and in fact the affirmative evidence showed that they 
were novices in commercial real estate transactions. 
Repudiation of Contract. The contract between the parties 
provides by its very terms that after sixty (60) days it may be 
cancelled by the defendants upon the giving of ten days notice in 
-11-
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writing (see Appendix A). After the defendants declined to accept 
the loan commitment of American United Life Insurance Company, and 
after Vandever made threats of suit against them, the defendants 
elected through their counsel, Carl N. Erickson, to cancel the 
agreement (See Exhibit 12-P). The cancellation took place long 
after the initial 60-day period. Under these circumstances, it is 
a mystery to the defendants how they could repudiate the contract 
by doing something that was specifically authorized.by the written 
agreement. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED JUDGMENT 
ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM 
At the inception of the transaction, defendants made a good 
faith deposit with Vandever in the amount of $3,000.00. Paragraph 
9 of the agreement between the parties (Appendix A) provides that 
$2,000.00 of this amount shall be returned if financing is not 
secured. Inasmuch as no acceptable loan commitment was ever secured 
by Vandever for the defendants, they were entitled to the return of 
their good faith deposit and the trial court correctly granted to 
defendants a judgment on their counterclaim for the $2,000.00. 
Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Irving Place Associates, Inc. 
(Utah 1980) 622 P.2d 784. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as cited 
herein, respondents and defendants respectfully request that the 
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judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, WEST & BROWN 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
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; PLAINTIFF'S 
I EXHIBIT 3- j° NO. 
( (. 
:1'1• rou.-.T- ,.,..,,.,,O,.,. .. l.. pi ... ,.."' *'U•1..01 .... o 
TUl..SA. o"' ............ o ....... 7.,"g 
AUTHORIZATION TO 08TAIH FINANCING ~f"' !lo'\:1~•u.., 
T•••• •0· 7••olrl 
1. The undersigned, being duly authorized, do hereby exclusively e~ploy, grant, 
commission and authorize '.Ji 11 iam G. Vandever & Company, hereinafter referred to as 
VGV, for the time period stated in paragraph four (4) of this Authorization and Agree-
ment, to make application (s) on our/w behalf for financing to one or more lending 
institutions or investors of '.JGV's selection for the purposes of 8u.1Lc 11l)tj, 
A 0 d c... r1' (2.. .s 0 {- I- I c ~ c cJ M.. p Ive. x / AJ S' £... t::. u -,-
It is fur~her agreed by and between the parties that any appl ication(s) for financ.ing 
to lending institutions or investors during the time -period of this Agreement shall be 
submitted solely and exclusively by VGV. 
. 2. This Authorization.is for financing in the amount of $ a 9 7 • 00 O, O 0 
.;!J..vl'LJ..L, t..L....,..,..._J.,..ub. ~~~ ~~&. TI t<-l.L ~ 
for a period of(~o) &1rz.:t-L/ 1 years, with interest at a rate of not greater 
than Td B e AJ E 91 u rtJ. r:>=-D % per annum, or for such other 
amounts and/or terms as may be acceptable to the parties. 
3. The undersigned agree to make available to '.JGV all documents or documentation 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of the lending ins:itution (s) or investor (s) 
without cost to VGV to whom application is made on behalf of the undersigned. 
- . 
4. This Authorization is effective from the date set forth below and continues 
for an initial period of ~CJ days fro::i the date on which '.IG'J has 
been furnished with all necessary plans, specifications, leases, contracts, cost 
breakdowns, financial statements, appraisals, and all other data reasonably required 
by the lender, and thereafter until cancelled in writing by the undersigned. 
S. It is further agreed by and between the parties that this Agreement may be 
car.eel led by either party following the expiration of the initial period stated in 
paragraph four (4) above upon the other furnishing written notice by registereo mail, 
re:urn receipt requested, such cancellation to be effective ten (10) days from date 
of mailing, however, in such event it is mutually covenanted and agreed cha: paragraphs 
six (6) 2nd seven (7) of this Agreement are not cancellable and will be given full 
for~e and effect in the event the undersigned should elect to cancel this Agreement. 
6. The undersigned agree that the lending ins ti tut ion (s) or investor (s) they 
are placed in contact with or providing the financing or the loan for the purposes 
hereinbefore sta:ed may be interested in financing not only subject proposal above but 
of various other projects now or in the future. Recognizing that contact with the 
lending institution (s) or investor (s) and the undersigned will be arranged by ~GV, 
his agents, assigns, or successors, the undersigned agrees to pay WGV the same per-
centage fee as provided in paragraph seven (7) O(:low of any financing, loans or cor.-• .,,i:-
ments thereof resulting from or made by WGV contacts or efforts, which, within srx:y 
(60) months of this date might be conmitted, made available, or paid to the under-
signed, their principals, agents, assigns, successors, or to ~ny person, persons or 
.entity affiliated with, associated with, o· ... int:d by or owning, controlled by or cont:-ol-
l ing the undersigned, their principals, agents, or assigns. 
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]. In consideration of ~GV services In negotiating such financing, the 
undersigned agree to pay WGV or his assigns % of the total amount 
of the financing or loan commitment at the time the commitment is issued to the 
undersigned, their principals or agents. WGV's fee will be considered earned upon 
the issuance of financing or a loan commitment by the lending institution (s) and/or 
investor (s) in accordance with the terms of paragraph two (2) above, and payment 
of WGV's fee will be due upon issuance of same • 
. 8. The undersigned agrees that upon financing being obtained, the financing 
or loan will be guaranteed by: /SJ-C..C!..11(. /3.l..A (....l( 13/~uk. 
AN p K. i LLpf).. c,J<.. 
9. A Good Faith Deposit of$ sOCJO • 0 0 is herewith attached which is to 
·be applicable to the financing or \pan fee. If WGV accepts this application, but d~ 
not secure financing WGV is instructed to refund to the applicants $ Z c:J(J O. O 0 
retaining$ /0-0 0 •V 0 , to cover WGV's cost in processing this application. 
10. The undersigned acknowledge that in exclusively employing, c~imissioning, 
and authorizing WGV to obtain financing, loans, or commitments thereof, that this 
Agreement and Authorization was negotiated and accepted .in and shall be governed by 
the laws of the State of Oklahoma. 
11. The undersigned agree that this Authorization is assignable by WGV and 
may be changed only by written agreement and that this Authorization and Agreement 
shall not be binding or valid until same is accepted by WGV in its offices at Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. 
,..-(.'  
Corp.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Title~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Date 
PLACE CORPORATE 
·SEAL HERE 
,;g '~'1 / rJ L1~7r]-' 
/ 
u/,/-:t 
J I 
1;', ; ... 6 
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